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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRUNO D'ASTON, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900223-CA 
vs. : 
DOROTHY D'ASTON, LISA ASTON, : Oral Argument 
and ERYCK C. ASTON, Priority No. 16 
Defendants-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE BRUNO D'ASTON 
JURISDICTION 
The Order and Decree appealed from was entered March 9, 1990. 
(R. 2325-30.) Eryck C. Aston filed his Notice of Appeal on March 
26, 1990. (R. 2367-68.) Bruno D'Aston filed a Notice of Cross 
Appeal on April 5, 1990. (R. 2388-89.) Both the appeal and cross 
appeal indicated that the appeals were taken to the Utah Supreme 
Court, which had jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) 
(Supp. 1990) .1 The Supreme Court poured the case over to the Court 
of Appeals in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 
1990). (R. 2436.) This court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1990). 
The underlying district court case is predominantly a 
domestic relations case. The issues on appeal, however, relate 
solely to a dispute between Bruno D'Aston and his son, Eryck C. 
Aston, and are not in the nature of a domestic relations case. 
SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS 
Bruno D'Aston has filed herewith a Suggestion of Mootness 
stating that the property which was the subject of this appeal has 
now been distributed to the respective parties, and there is 
nothing left upon which this court may act. This appeal is moot. 
Cinaolani v. Utah Power & Light Co., 790 P.2d 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Where a writ of execution is issued to enforce a decree 
and property is seized under the writ, does the subsequent reversal 
of the decree have any effect on the execution proceedings where 
the reversal was on a collateral issue, and where the relief 
obtained by execution was also sought under the complaint? 
2. If the trial court awards property based on a writ of 
execution and the writ is voided by reversal of the underlying 
decree, is the error harmless where the party was entitled to the 
property in any event based on an agreement between the parties? 
3. Was any error in excluding a deposition for substantive 
purposes, but allowing it for impeachment purposes, where the only 
possible use for the deposition was impeachment? 
4. Should this Court review a challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence where the appellant has not marshalled the evidence 
in support of the findings? 
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5. Is the testimony of the plaintiff on his own behalf 
sufficient to support a finding in his favor notwithstanding the 
existence of contrary evidence? 
6. Did the trial court err in including certain items of 
property in the formal order although not specifically mentioned 
in its memorandum decision, where the evidence supporting awarding 
those items to plaintiff? 
7. Does this Court have jurisdiction to review an order 
setting the amount of a supersedeas bond, where no notice of appeal 
was filed subsequent to the entry of the order? 
8. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in setting the 
amount of a supersedeas bond at a level higher than advocated by 
defendant, where the court had become familiar with the value of 
the property during the course of the trial and the trial evidence 
supported the amount of the bond? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ETC. 
Bruno D'Aston is not aware of any constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation 
is determinative of the issues presented by this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an action to determine the 
ownership and possessory rights in certain personal property which 
was seized under authority of a Writ of Execution and Assistance 
and thereafter held by the court. 
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B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below, Plaintiff 
("Husband" or "Bruno") filed his complaint for divorce against 
defendant Dorothy P'Aston ("Wife") on May 2, 1986. The complaint 
also named the two adult children of the parties, Lisa Aston and 
Eryck2 C. Aston ("Eryck"), as defendants and sought an order 
compelling Wife and the children to return certain personal 
property alleged to have been stolen from Husband. (R. 1-5.) The 
divorce case was tried before Judge Boyd L. Park on April 18-21, 
1988. (R. 307-32.) The Decree of Divorce, which included an award 
of personal property to Eryck Aston as well as to Husband and Wife, 
was entered on December 15, 1988. (R. 467-538.) Wife appealed 
from the Decree of Divorce, and the Decree was ultimately reversed. 
Piston v. Piston, 794 P.2d 500 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert. 
denied, Case No. 900452 (Utah February 6, 1991). See also P'Aston 
v. P'Aston, 790 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
On April 14, 1989, the trial court issued a Writ of Execution 
and Assistance. (R. 1707-08.) The Writ was served on April 29, 
1989, and numerous coins and other personal property were seized 
and thereafter stored in a vault at Wells Fargo in Salt Lake City. 
(Id.) Served at the same time was an order prohibiting Eryck from 
transferring or disposing of any of the personal property described 
in the Pecree of Pivorce. (R. 1737-38.) 
2The father and son disagree over the spelling of the son's 
name. The father spells the name Erick; the son spells his name 
Eryck. Several other versions of the son's name also exist. (Tr. 
405-07.) 
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Bruno thereafter filed an Order seeking to have Eryck held in 
contempt of court in accordance with the provisions of the Decree 
of Divorce3 (R. 1742-43), and Eryck filed a motion to quash the 
Writ of Execution and Assistance and to have the personal property 
returned to him. (R. 1753-55.) 
Eryck also filed a motion seeking to have the Writ of Execu-
tion and Assistance declared invalid or to require Bruno to post 
a bond. (R. 2069-73.) The motion was denied. (R. 2103-04.) 
On July 10, 1989, Eryck filed an affidavit asserting that the 
trial judge, Boyd L. Park, was prejudiced against him. (R. 2114-
24.) Judge Park recused himself (R. 2128), and the case was 
reassigned to Judge Ray M. Harding. (R. 2129.) 
The case was tried to Judge Harding on January 8, 9 and 22, 
1990. (R. 2209-14.) The trial court entered its Memorandum 
Decision on January 31, 1990, finding in favor of Bruno with 
respect to a portion of the seized property. (R. 2238-40.) Bruno 
was awarded costs, and requested costs of $8,252.55. (R. 2241-
44.) Eryck objected to the costs. (R. 2283-91.) Eryck also filed 
a Motion to Amend Order or Judgment and for Turnover of Consigned 
Property on February 20, 1990 (R. 2245-65), and objected to the 
form of the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which 
had been submitted by counsel for Bruno. (R. 2266-82.) 
3Paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce stated: "In the event 
the alleged stolen coins (exhibit nos. 22, 23 and 24) are found to 
be in the possession of the defendants, Dorothy D'Aston and/or Eric 
Aston, it should be considered as a contempt of court and punished 
as such." (R. 471.) 
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By Memorandum Decision entered March 9, 1990, the trial court 
disallowed the majority of the costs claimed by Bruno and denied 
Eryck Aston's Motion to Amend Order or Judgment and for Turnover 
of Consigned Property, and overruled Eryck7s objections to the 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 2314-15.) 
On the same date, the court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 2316-24) , and its Order and Decree. (R. 
2325-30.) 
Eryck moved for a stay pending appeal. (R. 2335-61.) The 
trial court ultimately fixed a supersedeas bond at $150,000.00 by 
order entered May 17, 1990. (R. 2418-19.) 
Eryck filed his Notice of Appeal on March 26, 1990. (R. 2367-
68.) Bruno filed a Notice of Cross Appeal on April 5, 1990. (R. 
2388-89.) 
On May 24, 1990, and based upon the representation of Eryck' s 
counsel that he did not intend to file a supersedeas bond (R. 
2429), Bruno moved for delivery of the coins awarded to him. (R. 
2423-24.) Eryck opposed the motion (R. 2437A-39), and filed his 
own motion seeking a more definite listing of the items awarded to 
him. (R. 2440-41.) On July 9, 1990, the trial court entered its 
Order to Deliver Personal Property, authorizing delivery of the 
coins awarded to Bruno. (R. 2522-26.) The coins were apparently 
withdrawn from court by Bruno soon thereafter.4 
4A copy of the Order to Deliver Personal Property showing 
initials of Bruno D'Aston next to coins he received was filed with 
the trial court on July 25, 1990. A copy of the Order, with the 
initials, is attached to the memorandum supporting Bruno D'Aston's 
Suggestion of Mootness filed herewith. 
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C. Statement of Facts. The relevant facts are set forth in 
the preceding procedural history. Additional relevant facts are 
set forth in connection with the Argument. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Bruno D'Aston7s complaint alleged that Eryck Aston had stolen 
coins and other personal property from plaintiff, and sought 
appropriate relief. Bruno later was awarded that allegedly stolen 
property in a divorce decree, and obtained a Writ of Execution and 
Assistance to pick up the property if it was located. Bruno 
located the property in the possession of Eryck, and seized it. 
The trial court ultimately awarded the property to Bruno. The 
divorce decree, which was the basis for the Writ of Execution and 
Assistant, was later reversed. The reversal did not invalidate the 
trial court's award, because the relief granted was requested in 
the complaint and was not dependent on the writ of execution. In 
addition, Bruno would have been entitled to the property under the 
directions given by the Court of Appeals in reversing the divorce 
decree. 
The trial court did not give improper preclusive effect to the 
divorce decree, which was later reversed. The portions of the 
divorce proceedings and findings relied on by the trial court were 
collateral to the decree, and not invalidated by the reversal. Any 
error of the trial court was further harmless. 
The evidence presented to the trial court was nearly all 
contested. Eryck Aston has challenged the sufficiency of the 
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evidence, but has failed to marshall the evidence supporting the 
findings. There is substantial evidence supporting the findings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
REVERSAL OP THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT BETWEEN 
DOROTHY AND BRUNO DOES NOT AFFECT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION THAT, AS BETWEEN BRUNO AND ERYCK, 
THE COINS BELONGED TO BRUNO. 
In June of 1990, the Utah Court of Appeals handed down a 
narrowly worded reversal of Judge Boyd L. Park's distribution of 
Bruno and Dorothy D'Aston's marital property and remanded the case 
back for enforcement of the 1973 post-nuptial agreement. D'Aston 
v. D'Aston, 794 P.2d 500 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Before this time, 
on January 8, 1990, Judge Ray M. Harding held a trial to determine 
whether certain coins and camera equipment found in Eryck,s 
possession were the same coins and property Bruno had reported 
stolen many years earlier. Judge Harding determined that (1) coins 
matching the description of those stolen had been found in Eryck's 
possession; (2) Eryck could not adequately explain why he had so 
many coins identical to those missing; (3) Eryck had sold many of 
the still missing coins to finance his recent expensive purchases; 
(4) many of the coins matching the list of those stolen were taken 
by Eryck himself. The second trial was based upon the overturned 
property agreement only insomuch that if the coins were found in 
Eryck's possession were the ones taken from Bruno, then Bruno was 
entitled to have them awarded to him. Once awarded to Bruno, the 
coins would still arguably be subject to division by Judge Park in 
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the remanded divorce proceeding between Bruno and Dorothy D'Aston. 
At this second trial, Eryck's counsel stated that "the only issue 
that is before the court with regard to these [coins and camera 
equipment] is whose they are. And what went on before is not 
particularly germane to determining . . . who it [sic] belongs to." 
(Tr. at 27.) 
The reversal of the property settlement did not effect a 
reversal of Judge Harding's determination that the coins found in 
Eryck's store were the ones Bruno reported as stolen. As a matter 
of law, a reversal by an appellate court extends only to those 
issues which are before that court, which are decided in actuality 
or by necessary implication. It does not affect collateral matters 
not before the court. 
This principle is illustrated by a case out of Montana. Aye 
v. Fix, 626 P.2d 1259 (Mont. 1981). Aye owned a lease on state 
land. Aye orally agreed to assign the lease to Fix, but instead 
gave Fix a sublease and an oral promise to give an assignment when 
the current lease term expired on February 28, 1972. About one 
year before the lease term expired, however, Aye sold the lease to 
Bruski and gave Fix a notice to quit. Fix refused to leave, and 
Aye sued to evict. Fix counterclaimed asserting he was the owner 
of the lands. The trial court ordered Fix to surrender possession 
of the lands to Ayes, which Fix did on July 13, 1972. The trial 
court ultimately held for Fix (the defendant) , and awarded him 
judgment for the loss of use of the lands. Fix retook possession 
and had use of the lands during the appeal. In Aye v. Fix, 176 
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Mont. 474, 580 P.2d 97 (1978) (Aye I), the Montana Supreme Court 
held the oral assignment to be unenforceable and ordered that the 
"judgment in favor of Fix is reversed, and the cause is remanded 
to the District Court with orders to enter judgment for plaintiffs 
and to determine the damages due them." 580 P.2d at 100. 
The second time around, the trial court awarded Bruski (who 
stood in the plaintiff Aye's position) a $3,013.21 judgment for 
loss of use during the appeal period, but denied Bruski's claim for 
loss of use during 1971 (while the sublease to Fix was arguably 
still in effect). The trial court relied on its findings from the 
first trial that Fix was rightfully in possession under the 
sublease from Aye. Bruski appealed, asserting that the trial court 
could not rely on findings which had been reversed. The Montana 
Supreme Court disagreed, and held "a reversal extends only to those 
issues which the appellate court decided in actuality or by 
necessary implication; it does not affect collateral matters not 
before the court." Ave v. Fix. 192 Mont. 141, 626 P. 2d 1259, 1262 
(1981) (citations omitted). 
In the present case, the appellate court's reversal of 
property distribution and its remand for enforcement of the 1973 
post-nuptial property agreement did not in any way affect Judge 
Harding's determination that the coins found in Eryck's possession 
were those stolen from Bruno. 
The trial court's authority and jurisdiction to award the 
personal property to Bruno rather than to Eryck was not dependant 
on the writ of execution. Bruno's initial complaint in this action 
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stated claims against Eryck for return of the coins and other 
personal property which Bruno alleged had been stolen from him. 
Judge Harding7s Order and Decree was well within the scope of the 
relief requested by the pleadings. The reversal of the divorce 
decree did not deprive Judge Harding of jurisdiction to afford 
relief between Bruno and Eryck. 
POINT II 
JUDGE HARDING'S DETERMINATION THAT BRUNO WAS 
ENTITLED TO RECEIVE THE COINS POUND IN ERYCK'S 
POSSESSION WOULD REMAIN THE SAME UNDER THE 
1973 POST-NUPTIAL AGREEMENT. 
Under the Decree of Divorce on or about December 15, 1988, 
Bruno was awarded coins and other various personal property which 
Bruno alleged were removed from his car and his motor home on or 
about April 30, 1986. Included in this property was a number of 
coins and other personal items including camera lenses, carrying 
cases and other optical equipment. Relying upon this property 
distribution, Judge Harding, upon determination that the coins 
found in Eryck's shop were those taken, awarded these coins to 
Bruno. The June 1990 reversal of the trial court's property 
distribution would not affect Bruno's rights to these coins in any 
way. The relevant provisions of the 1973 agreement state: 
2. The wife transfers, bargains, con-
veys and quit claims to the husband all of her 
right, title and interest in and to real 
property located outside of the United States 
of America and in and to all personal property 
in the possession of the husband or subject to 
his control in the United States, Europe or 
elsewhere in the world . . . . The provisions 
of this paragraph apply to all property de-
scribed herein whether presently owned or in 
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existence or to be acquired or created in the 
future. 
3. Hereafter and until this agreement 
is modified in writing attached hereto, all 
property real, personal and mixed acquired by 
either party in his or her sole name from 
whatever source derived and wherever situated, 
shall be the sole and separate property of 
such person notwithstanding any law, statute 
or court decision giving presumptive effect to 
the status of marriage; and such property 
shall be free of all claims, demand [sic] or 
liens of the other, direct or indirect, and 
however derived. 
The coins which were in the possession of Bruno prior to the 
April 30, 1986, theft were Bruno's separate property under the 
terms of this agreement. The Court of Appeals directed that the 
agreement be enforced according to its terms. The reversal of the 
divorce decree therefore does not affect Bruno's claim to the coins 
and other personal property. 
POINT III 
ERYCK ASTON WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY ANY EXCLUSION 
OF THE DEPOSITION OF MICHAEL GRAHAM. 
In Point II of the first half of Eryck's brief (on pages 10-
13) , Eryck argues that he was prejudiced because Judge Harding 
refused to let him relitigate issues which had been decided by 
Judge Park. Eryck challenged Bruno's claim that certain coins had 
been consigned to Bruno by Michael Graham, doing business as 
,I1841.M Michael Graham testified by deposition that he had not 
consigned coins to Bruno. Eryck apparently asserts that he was 
prejudiced by the exclusion of the Michael Graham deposition. 
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The difficulty with this argument is that the trial court did 
not wholly exclude the deposition of Michael Graham. The court did 
consider the deposition for impeachment of Bruno's testimony. The 
entire deposition was submitted to the trial court. The transcript 
does not show that any parts were excluded from the trial court's 
review. (Tr. 499-500.) 
While it may appear at first glance that there was a limita-
tion on the effect to be given the testimony, Eryck does not 
explain what additional weight could have been given to the 
deposition. Mr. Graham was not a party, and could not have been 
asserting any claim to the coins himself. The lack of a consign-
ment would not have strengthened Eryck7s case, except insofar as 
it weakened Bruno's credibility. The only possible use of the 
Graham deposition, therefore, would have been impeachment of 
Bruno's testimony. The trial court allowed that use. 
Because Eryck has not shown that he was prejudiced by any 
exclusion of evidence, the Order and Decree of the trial court must 
be affirmed. Utah R. Civ. P. 61. 
POINT IV 
THE AWARD OF COSTS WAS PROPER. 
Eryck challenges the cost award to Bruno of $368.75 for 
attorney fees incurred in connection with the deposition of Michael 
Graham. (Brief of Appellant Eryck C. Aston at p. 14.) Eryck has 
waived any objection to the award of costs, however, because he 
voluntarily satisfied the judgment for costs. (R. 2481-82.) 
Jacobsen, Morrin & Robbins Construction Co. v. St. Joseph High 
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School Board of Financial Trustees, 794 P. 2d 505 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
The cost award was, in any event, proper. The deposition was 
taken out of state on the eve of trial. It was well within the 
court's discretion to award Bruno his attorney fees incurred in 
obtaining representation at the deposition out of state. See City 
of Kingman v. Havatone, 14 Ariz. App. 585, 485 P.2d 574, 579 
(1971). 
POINT V 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS. 
Eryck argues in Point I of his Appendix (at pages 29-34) that 
the evidence was insufficient to sustain the trial court's 
findings. Eryck supports his argument by arguing that the 
applicable burden of proof is higher than in a criminal case, and 
then setting forth only the evidence favorable to Eryck without 
marshalling the evidence which supports the trial court's findings. 
Eryck argues that Bruno was required to prove his title to the 
coins with "reasonable certainty," and cites as support the case 
of Burgess v. Small, 117 A.2d 344 (Me. 1955). Eryck apparently 
asserts that "reasonable certainty" is something greater than 
preponderance of the evidence, and is fact greater than "beyond a 
reasonable doubt." (R. 2062.) The language of the Burgess opinion 
clearly establishes that it is not: 
The degree of particularity with which 
identification must be made in proof of a 
conversion in a trover action will vary with 
the circumstances of the case. Where, as 
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here, there is opportunity for commingling of 
animals of the plaintiff with other animals of 
like breed and answering the same general 
description, identification must be made with 
reasonable certainty. In Exchange State Bank 
of Glendive v. Occident Elevator Co.. 95 Mont. 
78, 24 P.2d 126, at page 129, 90 A.L.R. 740, 
the Court said: "The rule as to circumstan-
tial evidence in a civil case is that a party 
will prevail if the preponderance of the 
evidence is in his favor. This court has 
said: *The solution of any issue in a civil 
case may rest entirely upon circumstantial 
evidence. * * * All that is required is that 
the evidence shall produce moral certainty in 
an unprejudiced mind. * * * In other words, 
when it furnishes support for the plaintiff's 
theory of the case, and thus tends to exclude 
any other theory, it is sufficient to sustain 
a verdict or decision.'" 
The theory adopted by plaintiff must emerge as 
the most probable, and the evidence, if it is 
to suffice, must tend to eliminate other 
theories by force of the greater probability 
and rational consistency of the plaintiff's 
theory. This requirement is not met by wish-
ful thinking or a likely guess. 
117 A.2d at 345-46 (emphasis added). 
The holding of Burgess, therefore, is that there must be some 
substantial evidence to support the finding, not mere conjecture. 
Accord Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986); 
Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 
1978) . This holding is in accordance with Utah law in conversion 
cases. Amoss v. Broadbent, 30 Utah 2d 165, 514 P.2d 1284, 1286 
(1973) . Bruno's evidence was not mere speculation, but meets the 
reasonable certainty requirement. 
Eryck challenges the evidence as insufficient, but has not 
properly presented his challenge. When challenging a trial court's 
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findings, the appellant is required to marshall all the evidence 
supporting the finding, and then show that the evidence is insuffi-
cient. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
Rather than marshalling the evidence, Eryck presents only that 
favorable to his point of view. A few examples should be suffi-
cient (references are to the paragraphs of the Additional Statement 
of Facts on pages 20-23 of Eryck's brief): 
In paragraph 5 of his Statement of Facts, Eryck gives his 
explanation of how he obtained the large inventory located in his 
store in January and February, 1989. Eryck fails to mention the 
evidence that at the time of the divorce trial, April, 1988, the 
value of his coin collection was only $5,000.00. (Tr. 377, 517.) 
Eryck's own witness acknowledged that Eryck would have needed to 
have a lot of money to acquire his inventory. (Tr. 479.) Eryck 
testified that the initial value of his inventory was $150,000.00 
to $200,000.00. (Tr. 409.) Yet, in addition to having the money 
to purchase that inventory, according to Eryck/s theory, he also 
was able to give $110,000.00 to his sister (Tr. 444-45), and spent 
approximately $70,000.00 on a second condominium. (Tr. 409.) 
These facts provide proper support for the trial court's finding 
that the court "finds and reasonably infers that much of the 
capital for co-defendant Eryck Aston7s recent purchases came from 
the sale of plaintiff's coins, many of which are still missing." 
(R. 2319 J 14.) 
In paragraph 6 of the Statement of Facts, Eryck asserts that 
he presented original invoices for many purchases. He fails to 
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disclose testimony that many of the invoices could not be matched 
to the coins which were seized. (Tr. 378, 412-15, 417.) 
In paragraph 11 of his Statement of Facts, Eryck asserts that 
Gary Fernandez, a dealer from California, testified to having seen 
one of the coins bearing Bruno's stamped "A" as part of Barbara 
Goldfried's collection. Mr. Fernandez also testified, however, 
that he had purchased certain "A" stamped coins from Bruno (Tr. 
299-303), and that he had seen him at certain coin shows (Tr. 299-
3 00) . Bruno testified that he had never parted with any marked 
coins (Tr. 515) , and that he had never done business with Mr. 
Fernandez and was not at a coin show where Mr. Fernandez claimed 
to have met him. (Id.) In addition, there was evidence that at 
least one of the coins identified by Fernandez as having Bruno's 
stamp in fact had an imitated stamp. (Tr. 516.) 
In paragraph 12 of his Statement of Facts, Eryck asserts that 
Bruno's statement that "apart from the A, could be mine could be 
not," applies to "the coins which were before the court." A review 
of the cited page of the transcript reveals that the statement 
applies only to certain peace dollars, and that part of the set of 
peace dollars in fact did have the "A" stamp. (Tr. 217. See also 
Tr. 262-63.) 
In paragraph 14(a) of his Statement of Facts, Eryck asserts 
that Bruno testified that certain coins were not identifiable. 
Eryck omits the evidence that the numbers of the particular types 
of coin recovered matched almost exactly the numbers which Bruno 
claims were stolen. (Tr. 205.) 
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In paragraph 14(c) of his Statement of Facts, Eryck again 
asserts that Bruno testified he had no way to identify the coins 
listed on page 8 of Exhibit 8. Eryck fails to mention that Bruno 
did identify many of the coins of that group. (Tr. 211-12.) 
More examples could be given, but Bruno should not be required 
to go to the effort of marshalling the evidence to support the 
findings, where the case law clearly places the burden to do so on 
Eryck. Scharf v. BMG Corp., supra. It may be true, as claimed by 
Eryck, that the primary support for Bruno's case was his own 
testimony. It was well within the court's discretion, nonethe-
less, to accept the testimony of Bruno on those issues and reject 
the evidence offered by Eryck. Guinand v. Walton, 25 Utah 2d 253, 
480 P.2d 137, 139 (1971). See also Groen v. Tri-O-Inc., 667 P.2d 
598, 603 (Utah 1983). 
POINT VI 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN INCLUDING 
CERTAIN ITEMS OF PROPERTY IN THE DECREE 
AND POST-TRIAL ORDERS. 
Eryck asserts that the Order and Decree entered by the trial 
court improperly included certain coins not specifically listed on 
the trial court's Memorandum Decision. A review of each claim 
demonstrates that it is without merit: 
A. 18.5 Gram Gold Nugget. On the very bottom of page 1 of 
the list of coins attached to the police report, Bruno listed an 
84.5 gram Alaska gold nugget. Bruno testified that the 84.5 gram 
designation was an error, because an 84.5 gram nugget could not be 
found outside of a museum, and that the 18.5 gram nugget was in 
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fact his. (Tr. 202-03.) The trial court's finding on this issue 
is supported by the evidence. 
B. 84 Common Date BU-Dollars and 60 Common Date CIRC-
Dollars. The police report, page 2, shows a total of 520 Common 
Date BU-Dollars and 440 Common Date CIRC-Dollars were stolen from 
Bruno. It was within the court's discretion to include these coins 
on the list to be awarded to Bruno. 
C. The 1914-S $20 U.S. Gold Piece. This coin is listed on 
the bottom of page 1 of the list of coins attached to the police 
report. 
D. Consigned Coins. The justification for the inclusion of 
the consigned coins is presented above. 
E. 1904-S U.S. $20 Gold Coin. This coin was marked with an 
"A" (Tr. 98-99), and Bruno testified that all of the "A" coins were 
his. (Tr. 64, 66-67.) 
Eryck further argues that the trial court somehow erred in 
allowing an Order to Deliver Personal Property (R. 2522-26) to be 
signed by signature stamp. (Appellant's brief at p. 41.) Eryck 
does not describe any specific error in the Order to Deliver. In 
any event, the signing of the order occurred on July 9, 1990, long 
after Eryck's notice of appeal. This Court lacks jurisdiction to 
consider any errors relating to the Order to Deliver Personal 
Property. 
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POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN ITS RULINGS REGARDING BONDS. 
Eryck challenges the trial court's failure to require the 
posting of a bond as a condition for holding the seized coins prior 
to trial. Eryck does not, however, state what relief he seeks by 
reason of the claimed impropriety. Any error in the issuance of 
the Writ of Execution and Assistance is harmless, because many of 
the seized coins and property were awarded to Bruno. Furthermore, 
the issue is moot because Eryck seeks no relief by reason of the 
claimed violation. 
Eryck also challenges the trial court's order requiring Eryck 
to post a supersedeas bond in the sum of $150,000.00 to obtain a 
stay pending appeal. The initial problem with this claim is that 
the challenged order was entered May 17, 1990, nearly two months 
after Eryck's notice of appeal. Eryck did not file a separate 
notice of appeal with respect to the supersedeas bond. This Court 
lacks jurisdiction to review the propriety of the bond. 
The amount of the bond is, in any event, within the trial 
court's discretion, and no abuse of discretion appears. Eryck 
supports his argument by asserting that the only evidence of value 
before the court was his own affidavit. Eryck fails to acknowledge 
that there had been extensive and widely varying evidence concern-
ing value presented at the trial. (E.g., Tr. 155, 190, 409, 461, 
472.) In addition, many invoices showing the claimed initial 
purchase price of the coins were submitted at trial. The trial 
court had adequate support for its statement that it was familiar 
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with the value of the coins. It cannot be said that the trial 
court abused its discretion in fixing the bond at $150,000.00. 
CONCLUSION 
All of Eryck's claims are moot, because the coins and other 
personal property which were the subject of this action have been 
delivered to the parties, and this court's ruling can have no 
effect. Even if this case is not moot, the decision of the trial 
court should be affirmed. The evidence presented to the court was 
hotly contested. There was evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings, and those findings must be affirmed. 
Eryck Aston's appeal should be dismissed, or alternatively, 
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED this 28th day of February, 1991. 
S. REX LEWIS, 
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Memorandum Decision 
January 31, 1990 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
********** 
BRUNO D'ASTON, 
Plaintiffs, Case Number CV86 1124 
-vs- RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
DOROTHY D'ASTON, et al., 
Defendants, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
********** 
The Court, having conducted a bench trial to 
determine ownership of certain personal property as between 
plaintiff Bruno D'Aston and defendant Eryck Aston, finds that 
plaintiff is entitled to certain items of that property as 
listed below. The Court feels it has made a fair 
determination in this matter despite the lack of truthfulness 
which was apparent in the testimony of both parties. At the 
time of trial the parties agreed, and stipulated as to the 
ownership of some coins and optical and camera equipment. 
That stipulation is acceptable to the Court. At the time of 
trial the Court made oral rulings concerning the real property 
issues in the case. Those rulings are to be made a part of 
the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment which 
will need to be prepared as a result of this hearing. 
The Court finds that plaintiff has met his burden 
of proving ownership to many of the items tendered as 
evidence. When plaintiff's property disappeared he was able 
to make a detailed list of many of the missing items from 
memory. Some of those items while not exceptionally rare 
would not be expected to turn up in an average coin shop. 
While the Court realizes that most coins are not unique, many 
coins identical to plaintiff's missing coins, even those which 
were 
2238 
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unusual, unexplainedly appeared in defendant's coin shop. 
Several of the coins reported missing by plaintiff were 
stamped with an "A". Identical coins bearing an "A" were 
found among the coins in defendant's inventory. Defendant, 
though given the opportunity, did not adquately explain why he 
had so many coins identical to plaintiff's missing coins, nor 
did he plausably explain where he came up with sufficient 
funds to purchase the inventory for his coin shop, or the 
automobiles and property he has recently acquired. The Court 
can reasonably infer that much of the the capital for 
defendant's recent purchases came from the sale of plaintiff's 
coins, many of which are still missing. The Court can also 
infer that defendant had several coins identical to 
plaintiff's missing coins because those coins were taken by 
defendant. 
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the Court 
finds that plaintiff is the owner of all of the coins now held 
by the Court which bear an "A" stamp. Plaintiff is also the 
owner of the items held by the Court which match those items 
listed on plaintiff's first list of stolen property which was 
given to the police. Plaintiff's later inventories do not 
appear to have the same reliability as the original report. 
The Court further finds that plaintiff should receive any 
items held by the Court which match the list of consignment 
items as awarded to plaintiff in the divorce decree as listed 
on exhibit 24 from the divorce trial conducted by Judge Park. 
The Court will assume that the bullion which was part of 
exhibit 7 is a part of the bullion described in exhibit 57. 
All of these items are ordered returned to plaintiff. 
Defendant is awarded any items not included in the 
above listing, and any furniture which is now in his 
possession at his store. 
Plaintiff is awarded costs. 
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Counsel for plaintiff to prepare findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a judgment consistent with the terms 
of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for 
approval as to form prior to submission to the court for 
signature. 
Dated this 31st day of Januaj?^, A990^ 
THEVCOl 
cc: S. Rex Lewis, Esq. 
Keith W. Meade, Esq. 
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APPENDIX "B" 
Memorandum Decision 
March 9, 1990 
F I L E D 
Fourth Judicial District Court « 
CARMA B. SMITH1, Cferk 
Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
********** 
BRUNO D'ASTON, 
Plaintiffs, Case Number CV86 1124 
-vs- RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
DOROTHY D'ASTON, et al., 
Defendants. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
********** 
The Court, having considered defendant Eryck Aston's 
objection to costs and disbursments, objection to proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and his motion to 
amend order or judgment and for turnover of consigned 
property, will rule on those matters. 
Defendant's objections to the proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law on the whole appear to be an 
attempt to relitigate the case. At the time the memorandum 
decision was drafted, the Court was aware of the receipts 
Eryck Aston produced as a part of his claim of ownership of 
the coins. The evidence was given the weight the Court felt 
it deserved. The most reliable document regarding ownership 
of the coins was Bruno D'Aston's first list which he gave to 
the police. 
Defendant has also objected to findings regarding his 
failure to produce competent evidence regarding the source of 
funds for a number of his recent purchases. Plaintiff Bruno 
D'Aston raised the issue, and Defendant Eryck Aston had the 
opportunity to rebut or explain the items raised by 
plaintiff. The Court is entitled to draw reasonable 
inferrences from defendant's silence. 
Defendant's objections to the findings and 
conclusions are overruled. 
After consideration of defendant's motion to amend 
order or judgment, and for turnover of consigned property, the 
Court will deny that motion. In the prior action, Bruno 
D'Aston was awarded the consigned coins, and any obligations 
accruing because of those consignments. Ownership of those 
consigned items and any obligations that go with them is not 
the subject of this action. 
The Court has reviewed plaintiff's memorandum of 
costs and disbursements, and the memoranda objecting to and 
defending those costs. The costs and disbursments all appear 
to be reasonable and necessary except the $3,068.75 fee for 
execution by the constable, the storage fee and the locksmith 
fee. Sections 21-3-3, and 21-2-4 U.C.A. limit the constables 
fee for levying an execution to $15.00, and the storage fee to 
$5.00 per day. The maximum allowable storage fee is 
$1,270.00. The Court will therefore change those numbers by 
interlineation. The Court finds that the locksmith's fee was 
neither reasonable or necessary. The execution could have 
been done during business hours when no locksmith was 
necessary. That fee will therefore be excluded by the Court. 
With those changes the documents submitted by plaintiff will 
be executed by the Court. 
Dated this 9th day of March, 1990. 
cc: S. Rex Lewis, Esq. 
Keith W. Meade, Esq. 
Ronald R. Stanger, Esq. 
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APPENDIX "C" 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
F I L E D 
Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Utah County, State ot Utah. 
SMITH, Clerk 
Deputy 
S. REX LEWIS (1953) and 
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD (3872), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
K:Astn-fof.lo 
Our File No. 17,603 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRUNO D'ASTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOROTHY D'ASTON, 
Defendant. 
LISA ASTON and ERIC 
ASTON, 
Co-defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. CV 86 1124 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
Plaintiff's Orders to Show Cause against co-defendant Eric Aston and plaintiff's 
Motion for an Order directing the delivery of certain personal property to plaintiff came on 
regularly for hearing before the Hon. Ray M. Harding of the above-entitled Court on January 
8, 9 and 22, 1990. The plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis and 
Kevin J. Sutterfield, co-defendant Eric Aston was present and represented by his counsel, 
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Keith W. Meade. The Court, having received evidence and heard testimony of the parties and 
other witnesses, considered the memoranda of the parties, heard argument of counsel, having 
issued its Memorandum Decision dated January 31, 1990, being fully advised in the premises, 
and good cause appearing therefor, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court herein entered a Decree of Divorce on or about December 15, 1988, 
whereby it awarded various personal property to the plaintiff, including various items which 
plaintiff alleges were removed from his car and his motor home on or prior to April 30, 1986. 
2. The divorce decree also awarded to plaintiff a one-half interest in various 
personal property located at the marital home of 1171 No. Oakmont, Provo, Utah ("marital 
home"). 
3. The Decree of Divorce awarded the marital home to defendant Dorothy 
D'Aston. 
4. The Decree of Divorce also awarded to the plaintiff other personal items, 
including cameras, lenses, carrying cases, and other optical equipment. 
5. Prior to the separation of plaintiff and defendant Dorothy D'Aston, plaintiff 
was involved for numerous years in the buying, selling, and collecting of coins, rare coins, and 
other similar items. 
6. On many of plaintiff's rare coins, he stamped the rim above the head with 
the letter "A." 
7. Shortly after the plaintiff's personal property disappeared in April, 1986, 
plaintiff was able to make a detailed list for the police department from his memory of many 
2 
of the missing items. Some of those items, while not exceptionally rare, would not be expected 
to appear in an average coin shop. 
8. On March 15, 1989, Eric Aston made and executed a Bill of Sale to Lloyd Ross 
Engle and Jan Chapman Engle to various items of personal property located in the marital 
home. Eric Aston assisted in the sale of the real property and accepted a quit claim deed 
from defendant Dorothy D'Aston aka Dorothy Aston on March 14, 1989. On the same date, 
Eric Aston executed a warranty deed to the Engles for the sale of the marital home. At the 
closing of the sale of the property on March 14, 1989, Eric Aston received two trust account 
checks from Provo Land Title Company, one for the sum of $58,144.44, and one for the sum 
of $58,144.48, for a total cash receipt of $116,288.92. 
9. On April 14, 1989, this Court issued its Writ of Execution and Assistance. 
Pursuant to that Writ, John Sindt, a constable of Salt Lake County, took various items into his 
possession on April 29, 1989, from co-defendant Eric Aston. 
10. The various property identified as Exhibit 7 at the hearing hereof obtained 
by Constable Sindt, was previously located at co-defendant Eric Aston's business known as The 
Gold Connection at approximately 21st South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
11. Many coins identical to plaintiff's missing coins, even those which were 
unusual, unexplainably appeared in Eric Aston's coin shop. Several of the coins reported 
missing by plaintiff were stamped with an "A." Identical coins bearing an "A" were found 
among the coins in co-defendant Eric Aston's inventory. 
12. Though given an opportunity, co-defendant Eric Aston has not adequately 
explained why he had so many coins identical to plaintiff's missing coins. 
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13. Within the past several months, co-defendant Eric Aston has made significant 
purchases, including inventory for his coin shop, several automobiles, and two separate 
condominiums. Co-defendant Eric Aston has not plausibly explained the manner and source 
of the funds sufficient to purchase the inventory for his coin shop, the automobiles, and 
property he has recently acquired. 
14. The Court finds and reasonably infers that much of the capital for co-
defendant Eric Aston's recent purchases came from the sale of plaintiff's coins, many of which 
are still missing. 
15. The Court also finds and reasonably infers that co-defendant Eric Aston had 
several coins in his possession identical to plaintiff's missing coins because those coins were 
actually taken by co-defendant Eric Aston. 
16. The parties have stipulated that co-defendant Eric Aston claims no interest 
in the cameras, lenses, cases, and optical equipment found in co-defendant Eric Aston's store, 
and that the Court can enter an order awarding the same to plaintiff, which items were 
received by plaintiff at the time of the hearing herein. 
17. The parties have also stipulated that plaintiff makes no claim to various 
dimes, pennies, nickels, quarters, one-half dollars, dollars, and panda bullion which can be 
awarded to co-defendant Eric Aston and were received by him at the time of the hearing 
herein. 
18. Plaintiff has met his burden of proving ownership to many of the items 
entered as evidence herein. Plaintiff is the owner of all coins which bear an "A" stamp, 
including all of the coins now held by the Court which bear an "A" stamp. A list of the "A" 
stamped coins held by the Court is as follows: 
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1892 P 
1890 
1879 
1871 S 
1914 S 
1881 0 
1890 CC 
1922 D 
1923 S 
1924 S 
1934 D 
1896 S 
1904 S 
Morgan Silver Dollar 
Carson City Silver Dollar 
Metric Proof U. S. Dollar 
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty 
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - St. Gaudins 
1 set Diving Goose Canadian Dollar 
Morgan Silver Dollar 
Morgan Silver Dollar 
Peace Dollar 
Peace Dollar 
Peace Dollar 
Peace Dollar 
U. S. $20 Gold Coin 
U. S. $20 Gold Coin 
- Liberty 
- Liberty 
19. Plaintiff is also the owner of the items held by the Court which match those 
items listed on plaintiff's first list of stolen property which was given to the police. These 
items on plaintiff's first list of stolen property are as follows: 
Complete set of coins of The Golden West (36 coins in set plus 2 Calif, coins). 
U. S. Gold Dollars 
1 1849 - AU 
2 1853 - AU 
S2 112 U. S. Gold 
1 1905 - UNC 
1 1915 - AU 
1 1911 - D 
S10 U. S. Gold 
1 1910 - D - UNC 
1 1915 - UNC 
$20 U. S. Gold 
1 1871 - AU 
1 1897 - BU 
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1 1914 - S - BU 
1 1925 - BU 
1 18.5 gram Alaska gold nugget 
2,013 oz. silver bullion (1-oz. rounds; 5-oz. bars; 10-oz. bars; 100-oz. bars) 
187 Libertads (1982, 1983, 1984, 1985) 
Canada Dollars 
13 1958 - BU 
20 1962 - BU 
45 1963 - BU 
120 1964 - BU 
137 1965 - Type 1, BU, Type 2 BU, Type 3 BU, Type 4 BU and Type 5 BU 
60 1966 - LB - BU 
1 1967 - D.G. 45° - BU 
120 1967 - BU 
6 1967 - Canada proof sets with $20 Gold 
470 1984 - proof dollars and case 
U. S. Proof & Gem Silver Dollars 
1 1879 - Metric proof 
5 coins of 13 coin Gem set MS - 65 - CC - dollars consisting of 1-1879; 1-1882; 1-1883; 
1-1884; and 1-1890. 
84 Common dates BU - dollars 
60 Common dates CIRC - dollars 
Miscellaneous Gold 
6 1-oz. - K - Krugeran. 
1 1-oz. - M - Mapleleaf. 
3 Mex - 2 Peso 
3 Mex - 2 1/2 Peso 
2 Mex - 1947 - 50 Peso - BU 
Stamps - one book. 
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20. Plaintiff's later inventories do not appear to have the same reliability as the 
original list of stolen property. 
21. Plaintiff is the owner and should receive any items held by the Court which 
match the list of consignment items as awarded to plaintiff in the divorce decree, as listed on 
Exhibit 24 thereof and which are a part of Exhibit 7 and also described in Exhibit 57. The 
bullion which was a part of Exhibit 7 is also a part of the bullion described in Exhibit 57 at 
the trial and all of these items are to be returned to plaintiff. 
22. Co-defendant Eric Aston is the owner of the items not included in the above 
listing and any furniture which is now in his possession at his store. 
23. Plaintiff has incurred costs of court and is entitled to be awarded them from 
the co-defendant Eric Aston. 
The Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to and subject matter of this 
action. 
2. The Court should approve the stipulations of the parties made at the hearing 
regarding ownership of cameras, lenses, cases, and optical equipment to plaintiff and various 
coins to the co-defendant Eric Aston. 
3. Plaintiff should be awarded all coins which bear an "A" stamp, including all 
of the coins now held by the Court which bear an "A" stamp, and all items held by the Court 
which match those items listed on plaintiff's first list of stolen property which was given to 
the police. 
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4. Plaintiff should also receive any items held by the Court which match the list 
of consignment items as awarded to plaintiff in the divorce decree, as listed on Exhibit 24 
thereof and which are a part of Exhibit 7 and also described in Exhibit 57. 
5. Plaintiff should be awarded all of the bullion which was a part of Exhibit 
7 herein, and which was described in Exhibit 57 herein. 
6. All of the above-described items should be ordered returned to the plaintiff. 
7. Co-defendant Eric Aston should be awarded any items not included in the 
above listing and any furniture which is now in his possession at the store. 
8. Plaintiff should be awarded costs of court. 
9. Co-defendant Eric Aston should not be held in contempt for his actions in 
assisting in the sale of the marital home and executing the bill of sale on the various personal 
property contained therein. 
DATED this y day of February 1990. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
KEITH W. MEADE, ESQ. 
Attorney for Co-defendant Eric Aston 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRUNO D'ASTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOROTHY D'ASTON, 
Defendant. 
LISA ASTON and ERIC 
ASTON, 
Co-defendants. 
ORDER AND DECREE 
Civil No. CV 86 1124 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
Plaintiff's Orders to Show Cause against co-defendant Eric Aston and plaintiff's 
Motion for an Order directing the delivery of certain personal property to plaintiff came on 
regularly for hearing before the Hon. Ray M. Harding of the above-entitled Court on January 
8, 9 and 22, 1990. The plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis and 
Kevin J. Sutterfield, co-defendant Eric Aston was present and represented by his counsel, 
2325 
Keith W. Meade. The Court, having received evidence and heard testimony of the parties and 
other witnesses, considered the memoranda of the parties, heard argument of counsel, having 
issued its Memorandum Decision dated January 31, 1990, being fully advised in the premises, 
good cause appearing therefor, and having previously entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following: 
ORDER AND DECREE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The stipulations of the parties made at the hearing herein regarding ownership 
of cameras, lenses, cases, and optical equipment to plaintiff and various coins to co-defendant 
Eric Aston is hereby approved with each party awarded ownership of those items. 
2. Plaintiff is the owner of all of the coins which bear an "A" stamp, including 
all of the coins now held by the Court which bear an "A" stamp, and is the owner of the items 
held by the Court which match those items listed on plaintiff's first list of stolen property 
which was given to the police, more particularly described as follows: 
"A" Stamped Coins: 
Morgan Silver Dollar 
Carson City Silver Dollar 
Metric Proof U. S. Dollar 
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty 
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - St. Gaudins 
1 set Diving Goose Canadian Dollar 
Morgan Silver Dollar 
Morgan Silver Dollar 
Peace Dollar 
Peace Dollar 
Peace Dollar 
Peace Dollar 
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty 
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty 
1892 P 
1890 
1879 
1871 S 
1914 S 
1881 O 
1890 CC 
1922 D 
1923 S 
1924 S 
1934 D 
1896 S 
1904 S 
2 
Plaintiff's First List of Stolen Property: 
Complete set of coins of The Golden West (36 coins in set plus 2 Calif, coins). 
U. S. Gold Dollars 
1 1849 - AU 
2 1853 - AU 
$2 1II U. S. Gold 
1 1905 - UNC 
1 1915 - AU 
1 1911 - D 
$10 U. S. Gold 
1 1910 - D - UNC 
1 1915 - UNC 
S20 U. S. Gold 
1 1871 - AU 
1 1897 - BU 
1 1914 - S - BU 
1 1925 - BU 
1 18.5 gram Alaska gold nugget 
2,013 oz. silver bullion (1-oz. rounds; 5-oz. bars; 10-oz. bars; 100-oz. bars) 
187 Libertads (1982, 1983, 1984, 1985) 
Canada Dollars 
13 
20 
45 
120 
137 
60 
1 
120 
1958 - BU 
1962 - BU 
1963 - BU 
1964 - BU 
1965 - Type 1 BU, Type 2 BU, Type 3 BU, Type 4 BU and Type 5 BU. 
1966 - LB - BU 
1967 - D.G. 45° - BU 
1967 - BU 
3 
6 1967 - Canada proof sets with $20 Gold 
470 1984 - proof dollars and case 
U. S. Proof & Gem Silver Dollars 
1 1879 - Metric proof 
5 coins of 13 coin Gem set MS - 65 - CC - dollars consisting of 1-1879; 1-1882; 1-1883; 
1-1884; and 1-1890. 
84 Common dates BU - dollars 
60 Common dates CIRC - dollars 
Miscellaneous Gold 
6 1-oz. - K - Krugeran. 
1 1-oz. - M - Mapleleaf. 
3 Mex - 2 Peso 
3 Mex - 2 1/2 Peso 
2 Mex - 1947 - 50 Peso - BU 
Stamps - one book. 
3. Plaintiff should receive delivery and possession of all items held by the Court 
which match the list of consignment items awarded to plaintiff in the divorce decree, as listed 
on Exhibit 24 thereof, and which are a part of Exhibit 7 herein and also described in Exhibit 
57 herein. These consignment items are included in the items described in paragraph 2 above. 
4. Plaintiff is the owner of all the bullion which was part of Exhibit 7 herein 
as described in Exhibit 57 herein. 
5. Plaintiff is hereby awarded court costs in the amount of S fo?9.7£ 
4 
2328 
or 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that co-
defendant Eric Aston is awarded the items retained by the Court not included in the above 
listing and any furniture which is now in his possession at his store. 
DATED this / day nCTi In innr- 1990. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
KEITH W. MEADE, ESQ. 
Attorney for Co-defendant Eric Aston 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this */^  day of February, 1990. 
Keith Meade 
525 East 100 South 
5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
^14 
SECRET AI 
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